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Abstract
Most of hardware-assisted solutions for software security, program monitoring, and
event-checking approaches require instrumentation of the target software, an operation
which can be performed using an SBI (Static Binary Instrumentation) or a DBI (Dy-
namic Binary Instrumentation) framework. Hardware-assisted instrumentation can use
one of these two solutions to instrument data to a memory-mapped register. Both these
approaches require an in-depth knowledge of frameworks and an important amount of
software modifications in order to instrument a whole application. This work proposes
a novel way to instrument an application with minor modifications, at the source code
level, taking advantage of underlying hardware debug components such as CS (CoreSight)
components available on Xilinx Zynq SoCs. As an example, the instrumentation approach
proposed in this work is used to detect a double free security attack. Furthermore, it is
evaluated in terms of runtime and area overhead. Results show that the proposed solution
takes 30 µs on average to instrument an instruction while the optimized version only takes
0.014 µs which is ten times better than usual memory-mapped register solutions used in
existing works [2, 6].
1 Introduction
Software security is still a hot topic despite an important amount of research and development.
Existing solutions are either too expensive in terms of cost, performance, power and area or
either target a limited threat model. On the other side, attackers have more and more tools
and vulnerabilities available in order to exploit existing systems. Therefore, it is important to
provide solutions that can be easily adjusted on existing embedded systems without requiring
important development effort.
One common approach for software security is performed through events monitoring (such
as library calls, syscalls, specific instructions and so on). However, software-only solutions
add important runtime overhead [1]: that is the reason why hardware-assisted solutions have
been proposed. While they improve the performance overhead, proof-of-concepts are usually
implemented on FPGAs rather than heterogeneous SoCs due to the amount of effort, time and
money required to develop secure solutions on these platforms. Therefore, most of existing
works cannot retrieve information required for monitoring purposes on a hardcore CPU.
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Instrumentation is basically a transformation of a program into its own measurement tool
and is commonly used in hardware-assisted software security solutions. It is used in DIFT
(Dynamic Information Flow Tracking) [2] in order to protect against different types of software
attacks. Instrumentation can also be used for behavior monitoring [3], performance analy-
sis [4] and software error detection [5]. As it was previously written, instrumentation can be
done statically or dynamically. Static approaches modify the binary without requiring another
process and cover all paths of the code while dynamic solutions require another process that
instruments the binary and provides information only on the path taken by the application.
Static approaches provide less information than dynamic ones but are usually faster in terms
of performance because they do not require information at runtime.
All existing works using instrumentation do not provide a detailed description of their im-
plementations. Some works such as [6] use custom tools without describing them while others
use compilers or existing dynamic instrumentation frameworks for instrumentation without
providing in-depth details. RevARM [7] is an instrumentation framework for ARM binaries
which is oversized for this work.
This paper puts forward a novel approach for static instrumentation that can be used on
ARM SoCs with CS (CoreSight) debug components [8]. This work does not target some features
of instrumentation frameworks allowing to place the code at a given location. Nevertheless, it
presents how the code is instrumented and how the instrumented data can be recovered on a
reconfigurable device such as those included in Xilinx Zynq SoCs. The main goal of this work is
to propose an instrumentation solution for ARM-based SoCs which is easy to implement with
minor modifications, targeting modern OS (operating system) such as Linux kernel. Further-
more, the approach developed in this work is able to send both user space and kernel space
information.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides insights on existing instrumentation
approaches. Section 3 presents the proposed architecture and provides implementation details.
Section 4 provides different use cases. Section 5 details implementation results and Section 6
gives some conclusions and future perspectives.
2 Related work and assumptions
A lot of works have been done on instrumentation frameworks: these frameworks can be
architecture-dependent or independent, secure, static or dynamic. Soot [9] is a static in-
strumentation framework for Java and Android applications. Wala [10] also provides static
instrumentation library for Java bytecode. Atom [11] is another static binary instrumentation
framework on the Alpha processor platform for the Tru-64 OS. PEBIL [12] is a static binary
instrumentation framework for x86-64 architecture. Dyninst [13] is a static and dynamic in-
strumentation framework for multiple platforms (mainly x86-64 and ARM). Hijacker [14] is
an open-source customizable static binary instrumentation tool. CSI (Comprehensive Static
Instrumentation) [15] is also a static instrumentation framework for LLVM. LLVM [16], an
open-source compiler, can be used to create passes and instrument code.
In [17], the author presented an original solution using the debug components and a sec-
ondary CPU core (based on the NXP CPU12X architecture) to extract instrumentation data.
The main drawback of this solution is that it wastes another GPP (General Purpose Processor)
for instrumentation: as a consequence, the power consumption of this solution is doubled.
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Hardware-assisted instrumentation can use one of the above methods to instrument the
application in order to recover instrumented data on the FPGA part of a heterogeneous SoC.
However, using these frameworks require an in-depth knowledge of their API. In modern OS
(e.g. Linux), the memory-mapped solution used in [2, 6] requires an important number of
software modifications. More precisely, it requires to map the physical address of the instru-
mentation register to a virtual address. This modification requires changing the kernel ELF
binary loader. Then, this virtual address is sent towards the register included in instrumented
instructions (which can be done through relocation). Finally, the binary can use this virtual
address to write instrumented data. These changes require invasive modifications of the kernel.
The solution proposed in this work provides the lowest amount of software modifications.
The contributions of this work are the following:
• A novel, simple and hardware-assisted instrumentation approach that takes advantage of
CS debug components.
• This work proposes to add a system call to take advantage of the context ID feature
provided by the CS PTM component and use the CS TPIU component and the EMIO
interface in order to send trace and instrumented data towards the FPGA part.
• An improved and the first open-source version of the PFT (Program Flow Trace) decoder
that allows to decode trace and recover instrumented data on the FPGA part of ARM
SoC such as Xilinx Zynq.
3 Proposed approach
3.1 Software modifications
Instrumenting code using CS components can be done with a specific configuration; then, by
adding a syscall and using the newly added syscall with a few lines of C code.
3.1.1 Configuring Coresight
ARM CS components technical reference manual [8] explains how to program all CS compo-
nents. The Linux kernel 4.9 provides a driver for CS components. However, the support for
CS components on Zynq SoC was missing. The device tree was patched in order to use Linux
kernel drivers of CS components.
The approach proposed in this work requires the activation of a specific feature known as
context ID, that has not been used in any existing work to the best of our knowledge. Enabling
context ID generates specific PFT (Program Flow Trace) packets providing information about
the context ID of an application. The context ID of an application consists of the PID (Process
ID) and ASID (Application Specific ID) of the application.
The kernel is responsible for writing this value to a specific context id register. By enabling
context ID tracing in the CS PTM component, this value is sent into the trace. Instead of
writing PID and ASID into the context ID register, the value to be written is the value to
instrument.
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Table 1: CS configuration in Linux kernel driver
File name Value Description
mode 0x30
Enable branch broadcast
and context ID feature
addr idx 1 Choose address comparator
addr acctype 0 Choose comparison access type
addr range
0x106a0
0x10700
Enable trace in
address space given
enable source 1 Enable PTM component
Table 1 shows the values used to program the PTM component in the Linux kernel sysfs file
system. TPIU (Trace Port Interface Unit) is used as trace sink to recover trace on the FPGA
part via EMIO interface [2].
3.1.2 Adding syscall
Listing 1 shows the kernel code to be added in order to write the value to the context ID
register. The mcr instruction is used to write the instrumented value to the context ID register
located in coprocessor 15 while the isb() instruction triggers the write [18].
Listing 1: Custom syscall code in kernel/sys.c file
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(wctxtid, unsigned int, instrumentation_data)
{
asm volatile("mcr p15, 0, %0, c13, c0, 1\n"::"r"(instrumentation_data):);
isb();
return 0;
}
The syscall definition needs to be added into the kernel source as shown in Listing 2.
Listing 2: Custom syscall definition in include/linux/syscalls.h file
asmlinkage long sys_wctxtid (unsigned int instrumentation_data);
Finally, a number needs to be associated with the new syscall as shown in Listing 3.
Listing 3: Associate a number to custom syscall in arch/arm/kernel/calls.S file
/* 397 */ CALL(sys_wctxtid)
3.1.3 Writing C code
Once the kernel code has been modified, it is compiled with the write to the context ID register
option enabled in order to obtain the Linux kernel binary file (uImage). Once the modified
kernel is booted, Listing 4 shows how the newly added syscall can be used in any C program.
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Listing 4: Example instrumented code
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
int main()
{
unsigned dataToSend = 0x1234abcd;
// system call number is 397
// (cf calls.S file change)
syscall(397, dataToSend);
return 0;
}
3.2 Hardware design
3.2.1 Overall architecture
Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the approach proposed in this work (implemented on
a Zynq SoC) with a threat model similar to [2] where main threats come from the CPU and
the link between the CPU and the FPGA logic.
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Controller
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Instrumented 
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Figure 1: Overall architecture
After configuring CS components and running the program, trace is obtained on the FPGA
part through the EMIO interface according to the PFT (Program Flow Trace) protocol [19].
The important module developed in this work is the PFT decoder that differs with previous
existing implementation. Furthermore, this work improves the solution of Wahab et al. [2]
by adding the support of the context ID register. The entire design and code for this work is
available on Bitbucket: https://bitbucket.org/hardblare/
hw-static-instrumentation.
3.2.2 PFT decoder
The TPIU export raw traces to the FPGA part via EMIO interface. Listing 5 shows an example
of raw trace. Trace must be decoded in order to recover instrumented data on the FPGA part.
The PFT protocol [19] presents 11 different trace packets and their corresponding headers.
Figure 2 shows the overall architecture of the PFT decoder. The PFT decoder consists of four
FSMs (Finite State Machines): a global FSM that controls the other three packet FSMs (I-
Sync, branch address, and waypoint). There are other PFT packets such as a-sync, exception
that are also decoded by the global FSM. The most important PFT packet in this work is the
I-Sync packet as it contains the instrumented data. The global state machine detects packet
type and enables the corresponding packet FSM by setting start signal.
Figure 3 shows the FSM diagram of I-Sync packet. The FSM is in wait state by default.
When the start signal is set by the global FSM, I-Sync packet FSM goes into i sync state
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Figure 2: PFT decoder architecture
and starts counting trace samples. The received four samples contain the current PC (Program
Counter) value of ARM CPU. Once four samples are received, the state machine goes into
i sync ib state. If context id tracing is enabled, it can send one, two or four bytes. Depending
on the generic ctxtid value, the context id packet is decoded. For instance, if the generic
ctxtid is equal to “11”, then the FSM starts a counter that counts the number of received
trace samples.
wait_
state
i-sync
start = ‘0’
start =  ‘1’
count /= 4
i_sync_ib
count = 4
ctxtid = "00"
ctxtid_1
ctxtid_2
ctxtid_3
count = 1
count /= 2
count /= 4
ctxtid = "10"
ctxtid = "01"
ctxtid = "11"
count = 4
count = 2
Figure 3: Finite State Machine diagram for the I-Sync packet decoder
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When this number is equal to 4, then the instrumented data bytes are correctly received.
When the packet FSM finishes decoding packet, it goes back to wait state and sends the
stop signal to global FSM which then looks for the next packet type. The other packet FSMs
use similar mechanism to communicate with global FSM and have similar state machines.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
clk
data[31:0] 80 08 c8 14 10 00 21 cd ab 34 12 73 86
data_reg[31:0] 80 08 c8 14 10 00 21 cd ab 34 12 73
global_state_next a-sync i-sync wait_state_i-sync bap
global_state_reg a-sync i-sync wait_state_i-sync
Start_i
i_sync_state_next wait_s i_sync i_sync_ib ctxtid_3 wait_s
i_sync_state_reg wait_s i_sync i_sync_ib ctxtid_3 wait_s
i_sync_address 0x0000 0000 0x000000c8 0x000014c8 0x001014c8 0x001014c8 0x001014c8
trace_en
instrumented_data 0x0000 0000 0x000000cd 0x0000abcd 0x0034abcd 0x1234abcd
instrument_enable
Stop_i
Figure 4: Timing diagram of global FSM and I-Sync FSM of PFT decoder (Figure 2)
Figure 4 is a timing diagram showing how the PFT decoder works at each clock cycle.
All inputs are registered: for instance, input data is registered to obtain data reg sig-
nal. All FSMs work with data reg registered signal. When the global FSM detects an
I-Sync packet, it enables a start i signal (e.g. this is the case at the third clock cycle)
to enable the corresponding slave FSM. The I-Sync packet FSM then decodes the packet ac-
cording to the PFT architecture as shown by i sync state reg, i sync state next,
i sync address, instrumented data and instrument en signals. The instrumented data
signal contains the value instrumented by software. In the meantime, the global FSM waits for
a stop signal which is enabled by the packet FSM when the packet is decoded. Enabling stop i
signal at the thirteenth clock cycle changes the global FSM state according to data reg signal.
This allows to decode the received trace on-the-fly. The trace en signal allows to determine
when valid decoded trace is available while the instrument enable signal allows to deter-
mine when valid instrumented data is available. Outputs of the PFT decoder are also registered
to avoid timing failures due to longer critical paths.
Listing 5 shows the trace at the input of PFT decoder. It contains different packets detailed
in a Technical Reference Manual provided by ARM [19].
Listing 5: Raw trace
root@zedboard-hardblare:˜/tests_appli#./trace_etb
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 80 08 78
04 01 00 21 f4 ee 03 00
00000010 8b 03 08 8c 04 01 00 21
f4 ee 03 00 9d 03 08 98
00000020 04 01 00 21 ff ff ff ff
9d 03 08 a8 04 01 00 21
00000030 dd dd dd dd 85 03 08 b4
04 01 00 21 dd dd dd dd
00000040 9d 03 08 c4 04 01 00 21
aa aa aa aa 9d 03 08 d4
00000050 04 01 00 21 11 11 11 11
fd bc cf db 0d 01 00 00
PFT packets
a-sync packet i-sync packet branch address packet
Listing 6 shows the content of the instrumented data memory. The obtained values corre-
spond to the values inserted in the program source code.
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Listing 6: Instrumented data from decoded raw trace
0003eef4 0003eef4 ffffffff
dddddddd aaaaaaaa 11111111
3.3 Optimization
Rather than creating a new syscall as proposed earlier, this work proposes to modify an ex-
isting syscall called in the instrumented application. For example, if a malloc call is done
in the instrumented program and its behavior needs to be monitored, the associated syscall ,
which is either mmap or brk, can be modified in order to add the proposed code inside the
existing syscall. This way, a specific syscall is not required while reducing the runtime overhead.
This optimization is not possible if the program does not use any syscall which is rather rare
as most programs require kernel services which are only accessible through syscalls. Another
optimization could be to send multiple instrumented data values at each syscall rather than
sending one value. However, this is not possible due to the fact that the PTM sends only the
last instrumented value rather than all instrumented values during a syscall.
4 Case studies
4.1 Double Free
Listing 7 shows a straightforward double-free attack. There are three allocated memory areas:
A, B and C. First, A and C are allocated. Then, A is freed. Later, B is allocated and A is
freed again. This is the line where the attack happens. However, when this code is compiled
and executed, the Linux kernel does not detect any error. This type of attack can lead to heap
overflow, attack code execution or illegitimate privilege elevation.
Listing 7: Double free vulnerability example code
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#define WORD_SIZE (size_t)-1>0xFFFFFFFFUL?8:4
#define SIZEOFNORMALCHUNK 0x100-WORD_SIZE
#define SIZEOFFASTCHUNK 0x60-WORD_SIZE
int main()
{
char *A, *B, *C;
A = malloc(SIZEOFNORMALCHUNK);
C = malloc(SIZEOFNORMALCHUNK);
free(A);
// same location as A
B = malloc(SIZEOFNORMALCHUNK);
if (B)
// Double Free!
free(A);
return 0;
}
Listing 8 shows the instrumented code in order to detect the double free attack. Each
time a malloc or free function is called, another instruction is added in order to send the
information about the library function. In order to distinguish a malloc call from a free call,
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an example value of 12 MSB bits (0xfff) is added to the malloc call whereas (0xffe) is
added to the free library call. Then, the lower 20 bits are used to specify the region allocated
or freed. As an example, numbers are shown in instrumented value but static analysis can
provide generic variables, containing numerical values, that can be easily inserted instead of
numbers.
Listing 8: Instrumented code for double free detection
A = malloc(SIZEOFNORMALCHUNK);
// instrumented code
syscall(397,0xfff00001);
C = malloc(SIZEOFNORMALCHUNK);
// instrumented code
syscall(397,0xfff00002);
free(A);
// instrumented code
syscall(397,0xffe00001);
// same location as A
B = malloc(SIZEOFNORMALCHUNK);
// instrumented code
syscall(397,0xfff00003);
if (B){
free(A);
// instrumented code
syscall(397,0xffe00001);
}
Then, the program is compiled and executed after configuring CS components as explained
in subsection 3.1.1. An example output of the program execution and the content of memories
is shown in Listing 9.
After the configuration of CS components, the program is launched and the content of the
decoded trace memory is recovered using AXI BRAM controller (not shown in Figure 1 as it is
not required for the proposed design but is added for debug purposes). The first value obtained
in the decoded trace is 0x106a0 which is the address where tracing is started as configured in
CS components (see section 3.1.1).
Then, next values show the control flow changes in the program. In this case study, the
decoded trace is not used. Then, the content of the instrumented data memory is displayed
(containing the values inserted into the program). It can be noticed that the value 0xffe00001
is present twice while 0xfff00001 is present only once which means that the first region
is freed twice and allocated once. This example shows that the instrumented data can be
successfully recovered on the FPGA part and that the double free attack can be detected.
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Listing 9: Execution output for double free example code
root@zedboard: /tests-appli#./trace-tpiu-topleaks
coresight-tpiu f8803000.tpiu:
TPIU enabled
coresight-replicator amba:replicator:
REPLICATOR enabled
coresight-funnel f8804000.funnel:
FUNNEL inport 0 enabled
coresight-etm3x f889c000.ptm0:
ETM tracing enabled
DECODE TRACE
00 106a0 10358 106c0 104d4 106ec b6e3ec88 1057c
10378 10598 1039c 105a0 103c0 105b8 1039c 105c0
103c0 105d8 10384 105e0 103c0 105f0 10378 10600
1039c 10608 103c0 10620 10384 10628 103c0 10638
10390 10644 10378 10654 10378 10660 1050c 1066c
10390 10678 10378 10690 b6e3ecf8 b6e3ec00 00 00
root@zedboard: /tests-appli#
./get-instrumented-data.elf
/dev/mem opened.
Memory mapped at address 0xb6fba000.
fff00001 fff00002 ffe00001 fff00003
ffe00001 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
4.2 Other use cases
This method allows reconstructing the CFG on the FPGA side using a decoded trace [2]. There-
fore, using decoded trace, a control flow checker unit can be implemented on the FPGA to make
sure that no control-flow variations occur during program execution. This information is very
important as it cannot be determined statically. Moreover, it can be recovered without adding
syscall by correctly configuring CS components and avoiding important runtime overhead in
existing control-flow checker solutions.
There are other attacks that can be detected using this instrumentation strategy (for in-
stance, event checking): static analysis can detect events that are sent towards the FPGA part
in order to verify some properties. Therefore, this work suits the LTL (Linear Temporal Logic)
hardware-assisted verification solutions.
5 Implementation Results
Xilinx tools 2017.1 are used on a Xilinx Zedboard with a Z-7020 SoC (dual-core Cortex-A9
running at 667 MHz and an Artix-7 FPGA) to implement the architecture shown in Figure 1.
The PFT decoder and memory controllers are working at the frequency of 250 MHz. Following
subsections present an evaluation of this work in terms of runtime and area overheads.
5.1 Time overhead analysis
CS components do not add any execution time overhead as shown by Wahab et al. [2]. Even
though this work uses a different configuration of CS components (context ID tracing is en-
abled), CS components still do not affect the execution time. The time overhead is measured
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by using Linux perf command and by launching MiBench benchmark applications with and
without enabling CS components.
The overhead is only due to syscalls. On the target platform, the overhead of added syscall
is 30 µs while being 0.150 µs for the memory-mapped register approach. This work presents
a method which is slower than existing memory-mapped approaches. However, with the opti-
mization (subsection 3.3), time overhead can be reduced. If additional instructions mcr and
isb are added to an existing call, the overhead due to the syscall is removed and the global
overhead is only due to the execution of mcr and isb instructions. The mcr instruction takes
1 + x cycles (where x is the number of cycles spent in the coprocessor busy-wait loop) and the
isb instruction takes 4 cycles. Therefore, both instructions take 1 + x + 4 = x + 5 cycles at
667MHz. If this value is equal to ten cycles which is the case if the coprocessor is availble, then
the runtime overhead introduced would be 0.014 µs which is more than ten times better than
the 0.15 µs required for the memory-mapped register approach.
5.2 Latency and bandwidth
If n is the number of packets received in a PFT packet, the PFT decoder requires (n+1) clock
cycles to decode a trace. The maximum value of n in this work is 10. In other words, the PFT
decoder requires only one additional cycle to decode a trace and recover instrumented data
while the solution based on memory-mapped register requires on average 30 cycles in average
to receive valid instrumented data due to timing delays introduced by the handshake between
different channels. In this work, as 8 bits are sent at each clock cycle at the frequency of 250
MHz, the trace bandwidth is 250*8 = 2000 Mbits/s. The maximum bandwidth of the trace
port is 250*32 = 8000 Mbits/s. The AXI interface on a Zedboard can go up to 200 MHz.
Therefore, the maximum bandwidth of the AXI port is 200*32 = 6400 Mbits/s.
5.3 Area results
Table 2 shows the area overhead of proposed architecture which only requires 0.34% of slice
LUTs, 0.47% of slice registers and 2.86% of BRAMs on a Zynq Z-7020 device. The memory-
mapped solution requires 1684 slice LUTs (3.17%), 1523 slice registers (1.43%) and no BRAM.
The memory-mapped register solution takes more area because the memory required to store
data is implemented in FPGA itself rather than in BRAM as in this work. Furthermore,
the memory-mapped register approach requires an AXI interconnect block which has internal
FIFOs making it larger in terms of area occupation.
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Table 2: Post-implementation area results of overall architecture and memory-mapped approach
on Xilinx Zynq Z-7020
IP Name
Slice LUTs
(in %)
Slice registers
(in %)
BRAM tiles
PFT Decoder 126 (0.24%) 240 (0.23%) 0
Mem controller 1 18 (0.03%) 79 (0.08%) 0
Mem controller 2 18 (0.03%) 79 (0.08%) 0
Decoded
trace memory
2
(0.01%)
0
2
(1.43%)
Instrumented
data memory
2
(0.01%)
0
2
(1.43%)
Miscellaneous 16 (0.03%) 97 (0.09%) 0
Total Design 182 (0.34%) 495 (0.47%) 4 (2.86%)
Memory-mapped 1684 (3.17%) 1523 (1.43%) 0 (0%)
Total Available 53200 106400 140
5.4 Comparison with related works
Table 3 compares this work with the usual memory-mapped register solution which is widely
used in existing hardware-assisted instrumentation approaches. This work requires only few
minor modifications of the kernel (addition of mcr and isb instructions) while memory-mapped
register solutions need a modified kernel ELF loader and relocation units. This work has a lower
latency and a higher maximum bandwidth than the memory-mapped solution. Furthermore,
the area overhead is 6 times smaller than existing works.
Table 3: Comparison with previous works
Metric
Solution
Section III.A
Solution
Section III.C
Existing works
(memory-mapped)
Software
modifications
low low moderate
Latency
(clock cycles)
(n+1) ≤ 10 (n+1) ≤ 10 30
Maximum bandwidth
(Mbits/s)
8000 8000 6400
Runtime
overhead (µs)
30 0.014 0.150
Area
overhead (%)
0.47 0.47 3.17
6 Conclusion
This work proposes to exploit the context ID feature of the CoreSight PTM component in
order to instrument an application. The generated trace, which also contains the instrumented
data, is sent to the FPGA part using the CS TPIU component and EMIO interface. Software
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modifications required to instrument are minimal (about 10 lines are changed in the Linux
kernel). Furthermore, the hardware design required to decode traces takes less than 0.5%
of the FPGA area on a Zynq SoC. This work takes 30 µs for each instruction added in the
source code. The optimized version, which consists in removing context switch time overhead
by modifying existing syscall used in the application rather than adding a new syscall, give a
runtime overhead of 0.014 µs: it is 10 times better than 0.15 µs required for a memory-mapped
register solution. In terms of perspectives, the approach presented in this work will be ported
to Intel-based SoCs by taking advantage of the Intel PT (Processor Trace) debug component.
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